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ARMOUR

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Colonel Adrian Roberts MG, OAM

1939 – 2021


Colonel Adrian Roberts MG, OAM, died in Canberra in December 2021 at the age of 82; his service was held at the Holy Trinity Church in Curtin (ACT). He is probably one of the RAAC's favourite "sons" best remembered for his role in the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966.

As with most veterans, there was more to his life than just the Army or indeed Vietnam.

He was born Francis Adrian Roberts on the 11th October, 1939 in Perth (WA) just at the start of World War II; his father went on to serve with the RAAF in the European Theatre as air crew.

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**Mark your diaries, date for Cambrai Beersheba Dinner is Saturday,
12 November 2022**

SYDNEY ANZAC DAY 2022 ADVICE in RELATION TO THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARMoured CORPS.

On the advice of RSL NSW All ANZAC Day commemorations across NSW can proceed as normal this year. There is no requirement for QR code check in, and the wearing of masks is only encouraged for indoor settings where you cannot maintain a safe distance from others.

The RAAC has been allocated the Form up Point (FUP) as being located in Chifley Square and being similar to last year will put us close by the Wentworth Hotel entrance which is close by the intersection of Bligh St. (*Refer map p3 or visit [RSL-NSW-Anzac-Day-March-Map_4.pdf](https://www.rslnsw.org.au) (rslnsw.org.au)*)

It is strongly suggested that arrival to the FUP be around 0945 as the actual march off timings are unpredictable.

The order of March for the RAAC is the RAAC Association (NSW) inc, 1st Armoured Regiment (Vietnam), 3rd Cavalry Regiment (Vietnam) and the 1/15 Royal NSW Lancers. Moves are afoot to have the 1/15th band close by.

The reunion venue will be the same as previous years and is being held at the Civic Hotel, corner of Pitt and Goulburn Sts. Sydney. A 10 minute walk south from where the March ends towards Central Railway turning right at Goulburn St..

The Royal Australian Armoured Corps Association has secured a room located on the lower ground floor of the Civic Hotel for our reunion venue and comes with our own bar and toilets. You are encouraged to support the venue for a few drinks and comradeship as venues for this type of event are hard to come by in the city of Sydney. Families and friends are welcome.

Any enquiries can be made to Mike Butler on 0401 966 989.

B Sqn, 1 AR 1969





RSL
NSW

2022 Sydney ANZAC Day March Map




KEY

- March Path
- Participant Flow
- ☐ Cenotaph
- i Information
- Band Chute (Western side of Elizabeth Street)
- - Limited Pedestrian Access
- ♿ Wheelchair Accessible Viewing Area
- ♿ Public Toilets
- ♿ Accessibility drop off/pick up
- 🚕 Taxi Rank

CONTINGENT

- 1 Police Motorcycle Riders (V formation)
- 2 Mounted Police
- 3 ADF Duty Band
- 4 HE The Governor
- 5 RSL NSW Contingent
- 6 New Zealand Veterans
- 7 Australian Flags Contingent
- 8 Memorial Horses
- 9 WWI Unit Flags Contingent
- 10 Taxis
- 11 NSW Police Veterans
- 12 Royal Australian Navy and Merchant Navy (WWII + Post WWII)
- 13 NSW Fire and Rescue Veterans
- 14 WWII Army
- 15 Australian Korean War Veterans
- 16 Australian Army Training Team Vietnam
- 17 Head Quarters 1 Australian Task Force
- 18 Armour
- 19 Artillery
- 20 Engineers
- 21 Survey
- 22 Signals
- 23 Infantry
- 24 Special Forces
- 25 Army Aviation
- 26 Intelligence
- 27 Chaplains
- 28 Transport
- 29 Medical
- 30 Dental
- 31 Ordnance
- 32 Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
- 33 Educational
- 34 Public Relations Service
- 35 Catering
- 36 Pay
- 37 Legal
- 38 Military Police
- 39 Psychology
- 40 Nursing
- 41 WRAAC
- 42 UN & Peacekeeping
- 43 Army Reserve Units
- 44 National Servicemen
- 45 Royal Australian Air Force (WWII + Post WWII)
- 46 British & Commonwealth Forces
- 47 Civilian Air Crews
- 48 Entertainers + War Correspondents
- 49 Red Cross
- 50 SEATO
- 51 Sydney Legacy and War Widows
- 52 Descendants of Veterans
- 53 Allied Veterans and Descendants
- 54 RSL marshals and SES

More information: rslnsw.org.au



1 APC Lines at Nui Dat – post Long Tan (AWM P05655116)

Adrian completed high school in Perth and went on to the local teachers' college with a view to becoming a teacher; he actually started teaching there and even returned to the profession much later in life.

At about the same time he joined the local Citizens' Military Forces (CMF), the 10th Light Horse and served there for a couple of years.

In his early twenties he gained entry to the Officers Course at OCTU in Portsea (Victoria) which he remembered as being the best and worst year of his life! On the successful completion of the course, he was posted as a Second Lieutenant in the RAAC.

In April 1966 his new APC Squadron was sent to Vietnam and based at Nui Dat. On the 18th of August 1966 he received the order to lead a cavalry relief column (1 APC Sqn, 3 Trp) and went to the urgent aid of a beleaguered Infantry Company (Delta Coy, 6 RAR). For his outstanding leadership, he was awarded a Mention in Despatches (MID) which was later revised. He returned to Australia in the following year and continued in the RAAC.

He returned to Vietnam around 1971 with the famous Australian Training Team, the AATTV. Once again, he successfully returned to Australia and continued in the Corps holding various senior positions, eventually retiring from the Army in 1988 as a (full) Colonel.



APC from No 3 Troop 19th August, 1966 showing bullet hole (AWM P05655023)

Adrian returned to teaching in the ACT but found things had changed a bit but he still found dealing with students very satisfying. For his involvement in volunteer work in the veteran community he received a (civilian) Order of Australia Medal (OAM) for his efforts. In recent years he was also awarded the Medal of Gallantry (MG) for his actions at the Battle of Long Tan (which was prominently displayed in the medals on his coffin along with his Black Beret).

One further related event in recent years was the release of the Australian-made movie, Long Tan – “Danger Close” – where the young Lieutenant Roberts featured very prominently with his famous black shoulder holster and a chiselled-jaw profile! This would have increased his recognition and fame among the non-military sections of the population but it would have been great to have heard Adrian’s reaction to his very heroic and justifiable portrayal!

Health problems arose later in his life and he finished up at Fred Ward Gardens (aged care) in the ACT. He died there on the 29th December, 2021.

Rest in peace – your duty is done.

(The author acknowledges the details provided by his son Tim Roberts in his eulogy; more details came from the February 2022 Edition of the “Lancers’ Despatch” (NSW Lancer Association) and also from Mr Noel McLaughlin OAM, of the RAAC Corporation. Photographs came from the ABC (Online Article 8th November, 2016) and the Australian War Memorial).

B. Walters (Copyright),
06th March, 2022.

Second Lieutenant David Sabben (D Coy, 6 RAR) and then Lieutenant Adrian Roberts (1 APC Sqn, 3 Troop) at a recent Annual Dinner of the 7 Light Horse Bemboka Troop, Merimbula (NSW) (ABC Art.)



Is this the end of the tank

Advances in drone and missile technology highlight how tanks are becoming too expensive and cumbersome to be worthwhile.



The first three weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have not been a good advertisement for tanks.

The papers and TV news have been full of pictures of Russian vehicles in various states of disrepair or destruction.

A crucial factor in their struggle has been the proliferation of modern, highly effective anti-tank weapons among the Ukrainian forces.

In the weeks leading up to the invasion, Britain supplied a reported 2,000 NLAW (Next

Generation Anti Tank Weapon) weapons to Ukraine, numbers that have been bolstered further by contributions from the US, Sweden and other allies.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace announced the UK had sent 3,615 NLAWs in total, to which it would be adding a “small consignment” of its predecessor anti-tank system, the Javelin missile. These weapons enable infantrymen to take out even large tanks with rockets that are able to go up and plummet down in a high arc. This means they hit their targets from above, bypassing the armour on the front and sides of the tank.

The NLAWs have a range of 800m, which means operators can fire them and scarp before the armour has a chance to respond. “This could be a ‘battleship moment’ for the tank,” says Drummond, referring to the moment in World War II when planes, aircraft carriers and submarines rendered the largest battleships too expensive and cumbersome to be worthwhile. “Handheld anti-tank weapons have been a great equaliser. A little guy in a trench with a \$100,000 anti-tank weapon can defeat a \$10m tank.

While modern armies will likely always need armoured personnel carriers to transport infantry across varied terrain, the model of building an army around a large Main Battle Tank (MBT) with a big gun on top, which has dominated defence planning since World War II, looks increasingly outdated.

Since they were invented, tanks have steadily become better armoured, with larger guns, more sophisticated electronics, and larger price tags. These developments have added weight. With many NATO tanks weighing 80+ tonnes, they are difficult to deploy and operate. A modern battle tank is equipped with a suite of high-tech defence systems. Among them are explosive reactive armour, which explodes when it is hit to neutralise the incoming munition; active protection systems can intercept incoming anti-tank missiles; while electronic counter measures can incapacitate nearby drones or rockets. But these bells and whistles can be expensive, heavy and power-intensive, against threats that are becoming cheaper and more effective. At current rates of progress, the maths will stop adding up very soon, if it hasn’t already.

“We’re hitting the limit of how protected you can make a platform without making it too large or heavy. “At the same time, the lethality of what is firing at them is increasing exponentially.

Armoured vehicle design has always been a balance of trade-offs between mobility, protection and firepower. It’s wrong to see this moment as the death of the tank. But we’re likely to see a radical shift in tank design, towards prioritising mobility and firepower rather than protection.

This is not the first time the tank has looked out of date. Experts have been predicting its demise since at least the Yom Kippur War of 1973, only for the tank to reassert itself. The first Gulf War was a triumph for US tank commanders. At the battle of Easting 73 in February 1991, nine M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, admittedly obsolete Russian ones, along with 16 armoured personnel carriers and 30 trucks in just 23 minutes without surrendering losses. But terrain is all. What works on an open desert plain doesn’t in the woods or a city.

Even as recently as the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s traditional battle tanks, the T72s, looked like a vital part of what is called combined arms tactics, in which infantry in armoured carriers are supported by tanks, artillery, engineers and air power.



Eight years on, however, the landscape looks different again. The Ukrainian tactics seem to have worked out how to engage Russian armour with small, mobile units in urban environments, where Russia's strength in numbers is less of an advantage.

Drone technology has advanced, too. "Loitering munitions are a game-changer," says Drummond. Also called 'suicide drones', these are missiles launched by infantry from tubes, which fly around the battlefield for several hours, looking for targets. When one is spotted, the loitering munition then dives down and destroys it.

"A new tactic we're seeing is infantry advancing in protected mobility vehicles, before moving forward covertly on foot to engage tank targets," Drummond adds. "Or using loitering munitions from well behind the front line."

While tactics will evolve to take advantage of new technology, modern armies will continue to need armoured protection for soldiers on the battlefield. In some senses armour has never been more important.

The conflict in Ukraine has been a reminder that there are aggressors who cannot be defeated with drones and special forces alone. But armour, design generally, is different from the traditional image of a large, costly main battle tank, with a long barrel protruding from its turret. As the images from Ukraine show, without air superiority, and against a determined enemy with the right kit, tanks can be sitting ducks.

"We're unlikely to see massive tank on tank encounters again," Drummond says. "And the tank of the future will not be the tank as we know it."

Editor's Note: This article is a condensed version of one published in The Telegraph, 14 March 2022 by Ed Cummings.



Technical Notes & News

Major boost for ADF

Army News, March 17 2022



Soldiers from 1RAR and 2 Cav Regt patrol through Cowley Beach training area during a combined arms training activity
Photo: Cpl Brodie Cross

The ADF's total permanent workforce will increase to almost 80,000 personnel by 2040. In an announcement on March 8, Prime Minister Scott Morrison said the size and capability of the ADF would be significantly boosted to keep Australians safe in an increasingly uncertain global environment.

Under the plan, the number of ADF personnel will increase by about 30 per cent. Overall, Defence's total permanent workforce will increase to more than 101,000 by 2040 – an increase of 18,500 over baseline growth already outlined in the 2020 Force Structure Plan.

Mr Morrison said it was an important time to invest in increasing the size of the ADF, which will cost an estimated \$38 billion. "The first priority of my Government is to keep

Australians safe and to do that we need a bigger ADF with more soldiers, sailors and airmen and women to operate the cutting-edge capabilities we're getting to protect Australia," Mr Morrison said. "Our world is becoming increasingly uncertain so it's important we take steps now to protect our people and our national interest over the coming decades.

"You can't flick a switch to increase your army, navy and air force overnight. Growing the type of people and skills we need to face the threats of the future takes time, so we must start now so critical skills can be taught and experience gained. "ADF personnel will be increased in every state and territory, with a particular focus on capabilities associated with our trilateral security partnership between Australia, United Kingdom and United States [AUKUS], as well as air, sea, land, space and cyber." Minister for Defence Peter Dutton said under the 2020 Force Structure Plan workforce growth was critical to deliver and operate the capabilities Defence needed to secure Australia's strategic environment, protect Australia's interests, and build a credible military force.

"Defence operates with a highly integrated workforce spanning the Australian Defence Force, civilians and industry providers, with each bringing specialised skills and expertise," Mr Dutton said. "This growth in workforce and expertise will enable us to deliver our nuclear-powered submarines, ships, aircraft and advanced weapons. It will mean we can build warfighting capabilities in the domains of space, and information and cyber. "It will also build the resilience we need in critical areas and enable our people to increase intelligence, information and communications capacity. "Defence industry will also be fundamental to supporting Defence's capability delivery and workforce growth to deliver current and enhanced technologies, systems and equipment."

He said through initiatives such as the Defence Industry Skilling and STEM strategies, Defence continued to help industry equip itself with the skilled workforce it required to support the ADF. The expanded defense workforce will span all states and territories, cities and regional areas, with a majority of the growth expected to occur in Queensland, NSW, South Australia and Western Australia.



ASLAVs in East Timor during the 1999 INTERFET deployment.

UK procurement problems

By Alan Tovey, *INDUSTRY EDITOR*, 31 July 2021



Seven years ago, David Cameron, prime minister at the time, stood on Celtic Manor golf course outside Newport to proudly announce a new armoured vehicle for the British Army.

The Ajax reconnaissance vehicle, built by defence giant General Dynamics' UK arm, would "showcase the strength of the UK's highly skilled defence sector", he said.

It wouldn't be long before those words would come to haunt Cameron. Instead of showing Britain's military power, the project has become yet another example of the UK's broken defence procurement system.

Only 26 of the expected 589 Ajax vehicles, so far costing £3.5bn, have been delivered after an order worth £5.5bn was placed in 2014.

General Dynamics, the firm behind the Ajax admitted earlier this year that problems with the vehicles were known as far back as 2010.

Trials of the "troubled" light tank have also been paused because of safety concerns, which have left some personnel complaining of vibration injuries. Others have suffered hearing loss, which in some cases required steroid treatment in an attempt to reverse the damage.

Meanwhile, there remain concerns that it can't reverse over low obstacles and that firing the Ajax's main weapon cracks its hull.

Earlier this month, Jeremy Quin, the defence procurement minister, insisted the military, officials and General Dynamics were committed to making the Ajax a success. But when grilled by the defence select committee, he told MPs "we can't be 100pc certain that can be achieved".

Ajax is just the latest defence project to spin out of control. The Navy's aircraft carriers doubled in price to £6.2bn, causing Dominic Cummings, the former adviser to Boris Johnson, to say their construction meant billions "squandered, enriching some of the worst corporate looters".

Perhaps the most famous failure is the Nimrod reconnaissance plane. The £4bn project was abandoned when the technology wouldn't work, and the jets were torn apart by bulldozers to public anger. Many are now questioning why the MoD and defence industry haven't learnt from their past mistakes.

It's not in their interest, according to independent defence analyst Jag Patel, who regularly submits damning criticisms of the process to parliamentary defence inquiries. "The private sector is more interested in extracting the maximum amount of money out of HM Treasury than supplying equipment to the Armed Forces that is fit for purpose, adequately sustained and value for money," he says. He argues a "revolving door from the military into industry" means people, often without commercial experience, end up in senior positions in defence companies.

Then there's the issue of consolidation. About 40pc of the MoD's spending goes to just 10 companies, creating what Patel calls a "stranglehold" with no real competition that results in persistent delays and rising costs.


Prof Trevor Taylor, director of defence industries at think tank RUSI, believes problems in defence procurement are inevitable. "A lot of contracts are a competition of promises," he says. "The companies are saying they will develop, test and produce something by a set date, often with technologies that don't yet exist. And for a set price. It's crazy."

The problem is compounded by the scale of many projects, according to Taylor. "These contracts are so large that for some firms, if they don't win them, they are out of business."

This incentivises companies fighting for contracts to promise the lowest price, the fastest time and the highest performance, meaning "both sides telling lies", says Taylor. That leads to rising costs and delays when those promises turn out to be impossible to keep. "The problem is the MoD is being pushed for a price by the Government so they can budget it," says one UK defence boss.

Tanks and Capability Calculus II

By Andrew Davies, Canberra, 3 August 2021



An Australian Army M1 Abrams tank from 2nd Cavalry Regiment, moves forward in a simulated attack serial as part of Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021. (Credit: Defence)

I read Leo Purdy's response to my post about capability development and the utility of armour with interest. I agree with much of what he had to say and I'm happy to acknowledge that capability development isn't pure maths—there's no one rigorous answer. But there's also enough to disagree with to put down the towel, put the gloves back on and go in for another round.

Firstly, Leo and I are going to have to agree to disagree about the level of sophistication of the capability development process within Defence. If 'sophisticated' is understood as a synonym for 'elaborate' then he has a point—at one stage the end-to-end capability process required committees to consider over 60 formal documents over at least a dozen different steps. It has been streamlined a bit since then but I suspect there's still plenty of staff work to go around.

Nonetheless, it produces remarkably unimaginative solutions that for decade after decade have closely matched the preferences of the service chief sponsors, with everyone getting a go in turn. And sometimes it has produced results that are objectively wrong.

Before the First Principles Review, the Defence Capability Plan (the forerunner to today's Integrated Investment Plan—the name has been changed to protect the guilty) was preposterously oversubscribed. Half a dozen 'megaprojects' alone accounted for the acquisition budget in perpetuity, leaving nothing for the remaining 100+ projects on the books. (Defence admitted as much later.) Hundreds of person-years of effort went into producing a plan that failed the grossest of error checks. Elaborate the process was, clever it wasn't. I was involved directly or as a close observer for a quarter of a century and remain unconvinced that it's a rigorous process that can transcend group-think.

And as for scenario planning exercises, I've seen a few of those up close too. I've previously described some of them as featuring a 'Goldilocks war'—a scenario that is not too big, not too small, not too close, and not too far away. The answer comes out to be—you guessed it—an ADF that looks like the current one augmented with some new bits of kit.

A decade ago I looked at the ADF's force structure and asked 'what problem has as its solution 2,000 troops deployed on a foreign shore at the end of a long supply chain'? Then one day I walked into Defence to see a room abuzz with a beautifully hand-crafted scenario that had exactly that solution, with exactly the right amount of opposition to require some new plug-ins for the force structure but not so much that we'd conclude that the costs outweighed the benefits.

Leo is on much firmer ground when talking about the utility of various capabilities in plausible scenarios (though he's a little unfair in suggesting that my binary choice illustrative example was meant to cover the full spectrum of things Australia has to worry about). As he points out, strategic guidance covers a huge range of activities in a wide range of places. And almost any sort of equipment or capability we could think up for the ADF will be useful in some of them.

But my key point is that not all requirements are created equal and the bucket of money is not infinite. Of the many potential tasks that follow from strategic guidance, only a few are in the 'must be able to do' category of leading to national disaster if we fail. To be fair, I think Leo and I agree about that as well, though he possibly weighs the other tasks more highly than I do—which is fine, and exactly the argument that needs to happen.

Where we part company is on the relative utility of an Australian armoured contribution to a future existential crisis in the Pacific. Leo draws on the history of World War 2 to make a point about the utility of land forces in instances in which decisive results can't be obtained in an air-sea environment. That's a reasonable point that requires some serious analysis.

My view—though I'm open to persuasion—is that 'that was then, this is now'. The US had an economy more than ten times the size of Japan's and a production capacity that overwhelmed the ability of its enemy to replace losses in a brutal industrial-scale war. After Midway the outcome of land campaigns were rarely in doubt, despite some punishing losses at times, and the USN and US Army Air Force outmatched Japanese forces in both number and quality from 1943 onwards. Costs were high but bearable and the benefits were large, as the US settled into decades of air-sea hegemony in the Pacific. (As an aside, anyone interested in that WW2 history should read Ian Toll's wonderful Pacific Trilogy.)

History doesn't repeat, though sometimes it rhymes. But today a war between the major powers in the Pacific theatre looks far more like a peer-on-peer proposition—the more so as the years tick past. And the US regional story hasn't been the same on land as in the maritime domain. Since 1945 the US has fought two major land wars on our side of Asia, for a 1950s draw against a PRC that was far less capable than today and a 1960s/70s humiliating loss in Vietnam. It's hard to see Washington

thinking the potential costs of a contemporary land war would be worth the risks that would be involved.

So we can argue about the likelihood of a major land component in a future major Pacific war, and Leo and I would likely assign different probabilities. But even that's almost beside the point. We're not arguing about American strategy and force structure. Instead, we're worrying about where to invest Australia's defence budget. We can't take on a major power alone, at least not far from home. Our strategic goal would be to help the US prevail.

So the question becomes 'what is the best way to be able to sway the outcome of a war between major powers with the size and scale of forces we can muster'?

Now compare the potential impact of a single armoured brigade with a long logistics tail back to Australia, which is the scale to which the Army is being planned, against the contribution that the 'plug and play' force multipliers I mentioned (KC-30A, Wedgetail and P-8) can make to a wider American effort. I think the answer is clear, though others might still disagree.

Let me finish by making a couple of other points. First, armour is by no means the only capability I think we're in danger of over-investing in, and it's far from the most expensive example. The cost of the future submarine—over \$50 billion, though we apparently can't be told exactly how much over—is an eye-watering amount to deliver a relatively small number of weapons from the two or three boats we will be able to keep on station from sometime after 2040. I think the capability calculus is well off on that one.


Likewise, though at the much less expensive end of the platform market at 'just' a few billion dollars, armed drones that require a permissive air environment to be effective seem almost designed for wars of choice rather than necessity.

Second, there are indeed strategic circumstances in which investing in a larger and heavier army makes sense. If we were worried about an invasion of Australian territory—i.e. the land war comes to us rather than us going to a land war—then the more robust our land forces were, the more troops and materiel the enemy would have to bring, exposing it to potentially much higher costs from both interdiction in transit and in battle after lodgement.

That threat doesn't exist at the moment, and I hope we never need to worry about it again, but the whole point of strategic planning is to recognise that the calculus shifts constantly and sometimes rapidly. Our decision making needs to keep up.

Note: Andrew Davies is an ASPI Senior Fellow and former Director of the Defence and Strategy Program. He previously spent twelve years in the Department of Defence in capability analysis and intelligence.

Editor's Note: Article reprinted from *ADM Today* - 3 Aug 2021
<https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/tanks-and-capability-calculus>



Members of 7RAR begin dismounting from two M113A1 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) of B Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment, as they prepare to set off on patrol during Operation Concrete II. The APC (left) has the call sign 22, while the other vehicle may have the call sign 23A.
Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam - May 1970.

RAACA Memorabilia for sale,

AFV Crewman's Badge	\$20
Pocket Badges	\$15
Lapel Badges	\$15
Armoured Antics	\$10
Vietnam Video	\$10
Boer War Lapel	\$15
Army combat badge	Large \$20
	Small \$20

The Veteran web Network providing information to Australian veterans, ex-service and service personnel.
Reaching more than 12,400 readers daily and growing.

All service and ex-service personnel can subscribe to the Veteran web Network cost free. Information is provided via email from various reliable sources. Veteran web is an information service, while is not a forum you are welcome to contribute.

Some interesting statistics of veterans by electorate can be found at:
http://www.dva.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/publications/datastatistical/fedprofile/Electorates_Mar2016.pdf

Vale

Geoff Moran

It is with sorrow we report the passing of Lieutenant Colonel Geoff Moran ED Ret'd. Geoff served as a squadron commander in the early 1960s and was a stalwart supporter of the Association and Museum. Given COVID restrictions his funeral was a quiet affair.

Sincerely,
John Howells

Vale

Robert Fraser

Robert served in the Regiment in the 1960s reaching the rank of sergeant. He was also an active member and official of the RAACA club in Sydney in this time.

We lost contact when he moved overseas for work. He passed away on 19 July 2021 in Adelaide SA after long illness.

Sincerely,
John Howells
Secretary

HEARTY WELCOME TO OUR NEW MEMBER SINCE OUR LAST ISSUE

Mr. Paul Degiorgio, 1/15 RNSWL

Lest we Forget We regret to advise the passing of the following members

Dr.	Kevin	KD	Smith OAM	12/16 HRL, 6NSWMR
Mr.	Allen	AJ	Chanter	1AR
Mr.	Robert	RW	Fraser	1/15 RNSWL (official old RAACA Club in Sydney)
LT COL	Geoff	GA	Moran ED (RL)	Ex Sqn Commander 1/15 RNSWL
Mr.	Norm	N	McMaster	1 Aust Armd Bde HQ
Mr.	Donald Raymond	DR	Frazer	2/7 Armd Regt
COL	Adrian	FA	Roberts MG, AM	1AR, 10LH, A Sqn 3 Cav, Armd Cn
Mr.		CG	Spencer	2 Armd Bde ASC, 2/164 AGT Coy
Mr.	David	DR	Kidd	A/B SQDN 3 Cav Regt

British Tanks returning to Germany

By Dominic Nicholls, DEFENCE AND SECURITY EDITOR 25 November 2021 The Daily Telegraph

Heavy armour moved back to reinforce Europe's eastern flank.



British tanks are to return to Germany amid tensions with Russia, the Defence Secretary has announced, in a major restructuring of the Army.

The move will boost the amount of British military equipment available in central Europe, in an attempt to enable the rapid reinforcement of Nato's eastern flank.

British forces pulled out of Germany a decade ago, amid the focus on Afghanistan and Iraq.

The announcement forms part of plans to restructure the Army and "catch up" after years of under-investment.